Service · Incident Panic & Recovery
Fighting Fires and Rebuilding the Building, Simultaneously
"Most firms put out the fire, take a bow, then hand you a phone number for the rebuild. We smother the flames and frame the walls at the same time — so the lights come back on in hours of this engagement, not weeks of someone else's." — the response desk
24/7 emergency gnawing: NA +1 240 708 5412 | UK +44 (0) BRO-BRO-LOL
Overview
What even is "incident panic & recovery"?
It's the organized version of losing your cool: boxing the attacker out, learning how they got in, and bringing back the data, systems and workflows they scrambled. The "panic" half stops the bleeding and maps the damage; the "recovery" half gets a real business running normally again — securely this time.
Done right, the road back is short without cutting corners: nothing re-enters production until it's provably clean, evidence stays admissible for the lawyers and the underwriters, and leadership gets a plain-English progress feed instead of a shrug in hex.
Two ways to do this
The usual way vs. the Bros way
The usual way
Three firms, three egos, one relay race
Dig → handoff → rebuild
Lots of companies treat stopping the attack and restarting the business as separate seasons of TV, cast separately. One shop does forensics; only when its invoice peaks does another start rebuilding. That relay can add days or weeks of downtime, and every baton pass drops context, duplicates work, and starts a turf war at exactly the wrong hour.
The Bros way
One dam crew, both halves at once
STOP-IT CREW: box the intruder in · bag the evidence · certify which boxes are safe
⇅ talking constantly, same Slack, obviously
BRING-BACK CREW: find untainted backups · rank what earns money · carve a safe path back to life
Because both halves report to the same standup, you start recovering in hour one — not after someone else's final deliverable ships.
The first 72 hours, roughly
Pager rings. A human answers (concept verified). Triage call: what's down, what's leaking, what's on fire first.
Blast radius mapped. Sick machines quarantined. Attacker's keys changed under their paws.
Clean-backup inventory done; first critical systems rebuilt in a fenced-off corner and proven alive.
Most operations back, monitoring doubled, insurer and counsel looped with evidence-grade reports. Postmortem scheduled; group therapy optional.
Questions we get at 3 a.m.
Do you pay the ransom?
No. We don't negotiate with locker crooks, and we never touch ransom money — no brokering, no processing, no "we know a guy." We do talk to them while nodding slowly, which is free therapy for everyone involved.
Should we shut everything down?
Quarantine, don't cremate. Pull sick machines off the network but leave them powered — memory holds evidence; a powered-off machine only holds grudges.
Will our insurer care?
Deeply. We work inside panel rules and reporting rituals so your carrier gets what it needs while you're still alive to see the claim approved.
Is a hostile takeover covered as an "incident"?
Technically no — we're a services firm, not a private army. Practically: if someone starts acquiring your shares while emailing our staff "for an informal chat," we will treat the pattern exactly like any other intrusion campaign. We are extremely hard to acquire and slightly harder to unsubscribe from.
How fast is "rapid"?
Faster than your current plan, which is "hope." Most clients see first critical systems restored inside a day; full recovery depends on backups, architecture, and how long the intruder had a key before you noticed.
Every hour costs. Every day costs more.
The gap between "contained" and "back in business" is where companies bleed hardest. We close it from both ends at once.